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At the close of World War II, the future of economic development was the subject of
wide-ranging debates. Historical experience has since shown that these forecasts
were uniformly too pessimistic. Expectations for the American economy focused on
the likelihood of secular stagnation, which continued to be debated throughout the
post-war period. Concerns raised during the late 1960s and early 1970s about
rapid population growth smothering the potential for economic growth in devel-
oping countries were contradicted when, during the mid- and late-1970s, fertility
rates began to decline rapidly. Predictions that food production would not keep up
with population growth have also been proven wrong: between 1961 and 2000,
calories per capita worldwide have increased by 24 percent, despite a doubling of
the global population. The high rates of economic growth in East and Southeast
Asia were also unforeseen by economists. [JEL O10]
I
want to add to the stories about Michael. At the end of Michael’s first year at
Chicago, four of his teachers had lunch together at the Quad Club: Al Harberger,
Harry Johnson, Zvi Griliches, and I. Each of us said that Michael knew as much
as we did in our own field. But no one was prepared to say that we each knew as
much as all four people sitting around the table. So there was no doubt that the
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 Chicago faculty knew early on that Michael was an exceptional student, and his
subsequent career has lived up to that promise.
What I want to talk about are expectations of economic growth right after
World War II, viewing them from the standpoint of the present. At the close of
World War II, there were wide-ranging debates about the future of economic
developments. In this paper, I consider three aspects of these debates: (i) expecta-
tions for the American economy; (ii) expectations for the economies of Europe;
(iii) expectations for the less developed nations and, within that framework, par-
ticular interest in the prospects for India and China.
The debates about stagnation centered on the Keynesian analysis that macro-
economic equilibrium is possible at less than full employment, and, in particular,
on the interpretation of that analysis by Alvin Hansen in his 1938 presidential
address to the American Economic Association (Hansen, 1939). Hansen argued
that secular stagnation was likely because of (i) the end of the frontier, (ii) the end
of rapid population increase, and (iii) the end of capital-intensive technological
change. The key issue, as the stagnationists defined it, was not whether the growth
of the GDP would come to an end, but whether a high level of government spend-
ing was necessary to prevent a high level of permanent unemployment, even if
GDP did grow.
Table 1 presents the distribution of articles in JSTOR, the electronic archive
of  scholarly journals dealing with secular stagnation. It shows there was an
explosion of articles on the topic from 1941 to 1960, most of which were written
after the war or in anticipation of the imminent end of the war. That such a debate
would erupt in anticipation of peace is not surprising. The alarm about massive
unemployment was widespread in 1943 and 1944; the country was demobilizing
more than 11 million soldiers from the armed forces, and there were some 9 mil-
lion or more workers in defense industries who were simultaneously being let go.
So there were about 21 million people thrown on a job market of about 60 million,
including the armed forces and the defense establishment (U.S. Bureau of the
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Table 1. Distribution of Articles on “Secular Stagnation” in JSTOR
Period Number of Articles Cumulative Number
1 1938–1940 10 10
2 1941–1950 65 75
3 1951–1960 59 134
4 1961–1970 29 163
5 1971–1980 27 190
6 1981–1990 12 202
7 1991–1994 2 204
Source: JSTOR website: http://www.jstor.org.
Note: The first article to use the term, which appeared in 1938, was written by Arthur D. Gayer
and was published in the March issue of the American Economic Review; it mentioned “secular stag-
nation” only in passing. The second article to use the term, Alvin H. Hansen’s presidential address to
the American Economic Association, was published in March 1939 and ignited the subsequent debate
(Gayer, 1938; and Hansen, 1939).Robert W. Fogel
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Census, 1955, Table 220). But as it turned out, the recession of 1945 lasted only 8
months and was followed by a robust expansion that lasted 37 months. Moreover,
the recession of 1949–1950 lasted 11 months and was followed by another robust
expansion that lasted 45 months (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003, Table 771). The
peak came in 1953 after the economy had already absorbed 20 million potentially
unemployed workers, and unemployment was below 3 percent by 1953. Total civil-
ian employment was up by 15 percent over the wartime peak (see Bratt, 1953).
So, in a sense, what needs to be established is why this debate continued decade
after decade. Table 1 shows that secular stagnation was a heated topic throughout
1960 and was still lively in the 1970s and 1980s. Although unemployment remained
over 5 percent during some of the years of the long 106-month Kennedy-Johnson
expansion, it dropped to 3.5 percent in 1969. So even a quarter of a century after
the war there were still economists who believed that the United States could not
have an economy with both growth and low unemployment unless there was a very
big government sector. By the late 1950s the United States and other Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development countries were well into the post–
World War II expansion, now called the Golden Age, with growth rates twice the
long-term average of the other world leaders. Measured by per capita income, the
long-term average growth rate was about 1.9 percent per annum, and the growth
rate during the Golden Age was, for Western Europe, about 3.8 percent (Kuznets,
1971; Maddison, 1995; and Crafts and Toniolo, 1996). Over the period 1950–1999,
expansion multiples for GDP averaged about fivefold in Western Europe and the
United States (see Table 2). The wide-ranging debates over the causes of the accel-
Table 2. Expansion Multiples of GDP for 15 Economies, 1950–1999







5 European nations 4.98
China 25.59
Hong Kong SAR 28.01
Indonesia 9.48
Korea, Rep. of 38.93
Malaysia 15.61
Singapore 36.72
Taiwan Province of China 46.84
Thailand 23.68
8 Southeast Asian economies 24.06
India 8.11
Japan 16.09
Sources: Maddison, 2001; World Bank, World Development Indicators Online (http://www.
worldbank.org/data/wdi2004/index.htm).erated growth rates of the Golden Age suggested some points of consensus. These
included the reduction of barriers to international trade, successful macroeconomic
policies, and opportunities for catch-up growth following the end of World War II,
especially in France, Germany, and Italy. The destruction of much of the prewar
capital stock, the reconstruction aid that rebuilt industry with a more advanced tech-
nology, the successes of macroeconomic policy, the elasticity of the labor supply,
high levels of education, and the weakness of vested interests have all been advanced
as explanatory factors (Denison, 1967; Olson, 1982; Maddison, 1987, 1991, and
1995; Crafts and Toniolo, 1996; Abramovitz, 1990; and Mills and Crafts, 2000).
The eventual fading away of the stagnation thesis, of the notion that there was
something in the operation of capitalistic economies that made them inherently
unstable, brought to the fore several new concerns. These included the growing
gap in income between developed and less developed nations, and a new empha-
sis on cultural and ideological barriers to economic growth in poor countries. In
contrast to some of the early theories associated with the Harrod-Domar model,
which suggested that poor countries would grow rapidly if there were large injections
of capital from rich countries, by the 1960s the theory was that the export of capital
would fail to promote growth unless the deep cultural barriers that made these coun-
tries unreceptive to the conditions needed for economic growth were somehow over-
come. Some commentators, most notably Gunnar Myrdal, in his three-volume work
on the Asian economies, said that India would have difficulty sustaining high growth
because it promoted asceticism and thus undermined the acquisitive culture that
spurred Western Europe (Myrdal, 1968).
There was also a shift from worries about over-saving, which, I must say, never
caught on at certain universities. It didn’t catch on at Chicago or at Columbia. Nor
did it catch on at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Analysts such as
Kuznets, Burns, and others thought that savings were not a threat to economic growth
but were a necessary condition for economic growth, because savings were neces-
sary both to build infrastructure in developing countries and to get a thriving public
sector growing (Kuznets, 1961; Colm, 1962; and Samuelson, 1992).
There was, about this time, a new emphasis on export-led growth. The prac-
tice of poor countries selling their exports to rich countries got a bad name during
the interwar period and was widely viewed as exploitation of these countries by
imperial powers. The later view, looking at the Canadian and American experi-
ences, was quite the contrary (North, 1966; and Kravis, 1970). Selling raw materials
and other labor-intensive products to the rest of the world is a way to get developed
countries to provide capital to the less developed countries and foster entrepreneur-
ship. Thus, at the outbreak of World War I, foreign capital owned one-third of the
bonds of American railroads (Ripley, 1915). One of the great discoveries of eco-
nomic historians during the 1960s, which was confirmed in the 1980s and 1990s,
was that the Hobsen-Hilferding-Lenin thesis that English coupon-clippers got rich
from investments in poor countries such as India, and then withdrew large sums
of annual earnings, was wrong. After the computer revolution it was possible to
put the whole late-nineteenth-century portfolio of British overseas investments
into machine-readable form (Simon, 1970; Davis and Huttenback, 1986; and Stone,
1999). It turned out that there was a strong correlation between a country’s per capita
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income and the share of the British overseas portfolio invested in it. The United
States received the largest share, followed by Canada and Argentina (which at
the turn of the twentieth century had one of the highest per capita incomes in the
world). Of course, that discovery did not stop diehard critics of Western imperi-
alism, who then denounced Britain for failing to have invested in underdevel-
oped nations.
There was also about this time (the late 1960s and early 1970s) a new concern
about rapid population growth smothering the potential for economic growth in
the less developed countries. It reached its peak with the 1972 warning of the Club
of Rome (“The Limits to Growth”), which envisaged the world population getting
so large so quickly that it would soon outrun global capacity. That was not a view
shared by demographers, since demographers believed that with a lag of about 20
or so years, the fertility rate would follow the death rate down. The world would
reach a low-level rate of population increase at low levels of the death rate and
birth rate in the same way that there had been low-level growth at high birth and
death rates. An acceleration in the growth of the world’s population was a transi-
tory phenomenon, owing to the lag in the decline of the birth rate behind the death
rate. This forecast became known as the “theory of the demographic transition.”
By 1973, it hadn’t happened. If we add to Stan Engerman’s list of bad fore-
casts, we have to say that demographers run out of patience in about 20 years, if
what they theorize would happen doesn’t happen. And there must also be a malev-
olent deity, because just about the time that leading demographers began saying
the theory of the demographic transition was dead, the fertility rate in third world
countries, including Islamic countries, began to decline rapidly (see Table 3). Within
two decades there were many countries with total fertility rates below 2.1. Of course,
Kuznets never worried about population growth; indeed, he argued that a condition
for modern economic growth was that the rise in per capita income had to be accom-
panied by an increase in population. That was one of his central tenets in his 1966
book, Modern Economic Growth, and he repeated it in his 1971 Nobel address
(Kuznets, 1966 and 1971).
Arelated concern with the world population taking off in an unprecedented way
(with population doubling in less than half a century) was the belief that the pro-
duction of food could not keep up with the growth of the population. Ironically, a
major recent concern has been the global epidemic of obesity. Incidentally, one of
the countries that was supposed to have a starving population was China, which
increased its per capita food supply by more than 70 percent in four decades (see
Table 4). And for the world as a whole, calories per capita have grown by 24 percent
during the same period, despite the doubling of the global population (see Table 4).
As remarkable as what was widely forecast in the post–World War II debates,
and I have covered about a quarter-century’s worth, were the things not foreseen
in the 1940s, 1950s, or even the early 1960s. One of these was the extraordinary
economic growth in Southeast and East Asia, beginning first with Japan, which in
four decades went from a poor, defeated country to the second largest economy in
the world, increasing per capita income tenfold. This was a feat that took leaders
of the Industrial Revolution about 150 years to accomplish (Kuznets, 1971). The
economic miracle of the high-performing Asian economies other than Japan wasRECONSIDERING EXPECTATIONS OF GROWTH AFTER WORLD WAR II
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Germany (West) 2.0 1.3
Italy 2.4 1.2
United Kingdom 2.5 1.6
United States 2.5 2.0
Sources: Keyfitz and Flieger, 1990; Population Reference Bureau Datafinder (www.prb.org).
Table 4. Secular Trends in Per Capita Daily Consumption of Calories,
1961–2000
1961 2000 Percentage Change
China 1,725* 2,979 73
Indonesia 1,727 2,913 69
Korea, Rep. of 2,147 3,093 44
Thailand 1,938 2,459 27
India 2,073 2,489 20
Japan 2,468 2,753 12
France 3,194 3,597 13
Germany (West) 2,889 3,505 21
Italy 2,914 3,663 26
United Kingdom 3,240 3,312 2
United States 2,883 3,814 32
World 2,255 2,805 24
Source: FAOSTAT (http://apps.fao.org/).
Note: * indicates 1962.
also unforeseen, and that state of mind persisted into the 1970s. It wasn’t that
economists didn’t know that per capita income was rising, but there was a wide-
spread opinion that it couldn’t last, that somehow it was a fluke. So we have not
only the four Asian dragons, Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan,
going from being very poor countries to being quite rich countries, but also rising
incomes in China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand (see Table 2).
About four years ago I presented a paper at Peking University in which I fore-
cast that by 2025 China alone would be consuming 45 million cars a year, which
was then the world total consumption of cars. It looks as though that forecast is
going to be wrong, because it may turn out to be too pessimistic, even though my
friends in China thought I was a little overenthusiastic. I obtained the estimate byRobert W. Fogel
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taking the long-term U.S. income elasticity of the demand for cars between 1910
and 1970 and then multiplying it by an annual growth rate in GDP of about 6 per-
cent. But the Chinese growth rate has averaged more than 6 percent. In 2003, the
increase in automobile production was 37 percent, and production shows no sign
of an early petering out, evident in the fact that every major car company in the
world is investing heavily on the assumption that China and Southeast Asia will be
the major expanding markets for several decades (see Table 5).
Another thing that was not foreseen was the extraordinary and sustained growth
in agricultural productivity, which led, as I mentioned, to a 24 percent increase in per
capita consumption of calories. Despite the threat that fertilizers would become too
expensive (because petroleum is used to produce fertilizers), that threat, stimulated by
the sharp rise in oil prices during the 1970s, never materialized (see Johnson, 1980).
During the 1960s and 1970s there was a game played that involved guessing
how long it would take for the per capita income of the Soviet Union to overtake
that of the United States. That game was predicated on the false premise that the
Soviet Union was growing at a faster long-term rate than was the United States.
Different people had the growth paths intersecting at different dates during the
next quarter century. Those forecasts did not pan out. In the 1980s some people
started saying that Japan was going to overtake the United States. The new game
was to see when growth paths of the United States and Japan would intersect.
Despite this poor forecasting record, I’m very bullish on China, and a few years
ago I forecast that by 2030 China and Southeast Asia combined would have a total
GDPthat exceeds that of the United States and the five largest European countries
Table 5. Automobile Production in Southeast and South Asia Compared
with Five Western Nations and Japan
Production in Production Increase 
2003 (in thousands) over 2002 (percent)
China 4,444 35
Hong Kong SAR ——
Indonesia 322 8
Korea, Rep. of 3,178 1
Malaysia 345 −13
Singapore — —







United Kingdom 323 17
United States 12,078 −2
World 60,597 2.6
Source: Organisation International des Constructeurs d’Automobiles, survey for 2002–2003
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combined. I still think that’s a reasonable forecast, because I do not see the aver-
age annual growth rates in GDP per capita for these Western countries as a group
exceeding 2 percent per annum, as GDP is currently measured, and I think it’s
likely that the growth rates in Southeast Asia will be in the neighborhood of 6 per-
cent, perhaps higher in China. Nevertheless, U.S. per capita income in 2030 will
very likely still be several times greater than that of China.
I think I’ve largely covered how things looked after World War II, highlight-
ing both what now seems to have been an unjustified pessimism and also the dif-
ficulties in forecasting the future. I close with an anecdote from Simon Kuznets.
He used to give a one-year course in growth economics, both at Johns Hopkins
and Harvard. One of the points he made was that if you wanted to find accurate
forecasts of what happened in the past, don’t look at what the economists said. The
economists in 1850 wrote that the progress of the last decade had been so great
that it could not possibly continue. And economists at the end of the nineteenth
century wrote that the progress of the last half century had been so great that it
could not possibly continue during the twentieth century. Kuznets said you would
come closest to an accurate forecast if you read the writers of science fiction. But
even the writers of science fiction were too pessimistic. Jules Verne recognized
that we might eventually get to the moon, but he couldn’t conceive of the tech-
nology that actually made the journey possible.
I was at a 2003 conference at Rockefeller University that brought together about
30 people from different disciplines (economics, biology, chemistry, and physics,
as well as some industrial leaders) who put forward their views of what was likely
to happen in the new millennium. And I must say that the noneconomists were far
more bullish than most of the economists I know. So I suspect if we have another
MussaFest in 2024, we’ll all look back at how pessimistic we were in 2004.
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